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The question of how the biotechnology agenda is set has most interest when the outcome of that agenda-setting is in question. To ask what agri-
cultural biotechnologies might be beneficial and how their development and 
implementation might be expedited supposes that the existing institutions and 
incentives are somehow inadequate or unreliable. This brief discussion con-
siders how decisions about new technologies for food and fiber production and 
processing are made and at what point, if alternative outcomes are desired, in-
tervention might be contemplated.
THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM
In the traditional paradigm of economists, the marketplace is both the insti-
gator and the arbiter in the contest among new technologies. Unless supply-
ing firms profit, and consumers find utility in the new technology or its prod-
ucts, there can be no success. Questions about quality, safety and efficacy are 
largely answered in the market exchange, with oversight by public authorities 
in some cases. Technological innovation is induced by economic signals as 
embodied in the relative costs of inputs and prices of outputs. Induced inno-
vation can explain the transformation of American agriculture by observing 
that the post-World War II economic expansion made labor relatively more 
expensive compared to other major factors of farm production. Consequently, 
technologies were developed that substituted for labor with the use of capital 
in the form of purchased inputs such as large-scale machinery and later through 
organic-synthetic pesticides. In the traditional view, market signals set the 
agenda—from start to finish.
As with most constructs of economic theory, reality is more complicated, 
particularly in the case of the agricultural sector. First, there is significant gov-
ernment intervention in agricultural markets, interventions that intentionally 
distort market prices. For example, U.S. commodity subsidy programs inflate 
land values because acreage set-asides artificially restrict the supply of land 
and so raise its price relative to other factors. As a consequence, technologi-
cal change that saves land is induced, again reinforcing the capital-intensity 
of production. Second, much agricultural research and development (R & D) 
has had “public good” attributes, that is, displayed characteristics that make 
private sector participation unlikely even though societal benefits could be
had if a technology were to become available. So, for example, a technology 
such as contour plowing was developed largely by the public sector because 
the benefits from its adoption could not be restricted to participants in a mar-
ket transaction. Anyone driving by a contour-plowed field could figure out 
how to implement the technique without paying the originator for the knowl-
edge. Whether there are more such public good opportunities in agriculture 
than in other sectors is a good question, but it has historically been the case 
that significant public sector resources in the land-grant colleges and U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) have been devoted to both basic and applied 
research. Third, not all relevant aspects of agricultural technologies are re-
flected in market prices—another familiar form of market failure. Environ-
mental effects and human nutritional implications are two well-known ex-
amples. Fourth, the distribution of the costs and benefits of a new technology 
follows market signals, implicitly valuing welfare equally across individuals. 
So, for example, from the market’s perspective, a dollar of profit to a small 
farmer is the same as a dollar of profit to a large farmer.
The existence of such market distortions and failures has contributed 
largely to the emergence in public dialogue of the “fourth criterion” in assess-
ing agricultural biotechnologies. In this conception, socioeconomic and envi-
ronmental impacts of a technology or its products are evaluated alongside its 
quality, safety and efficacy. Manifestations of the significance of the fourth cri-
terion, particularly in the debate over the use of bovine somatotropin (bST), 
have been seen in the U.S., in the European Union and in Canada. According 
to the May/June 1994 issue of the Agbiotech Bulletin, the Canadian House of 
Commons agriculture committee may “recommend the federal government 
conduct social/economic/environmental impact studies on all new biotechnol-
ogy products before they come up for public scrutiny and that biotech compa-
nies be charged with the job of getting out information.” Such recommenda-
tions essentially represent calls to modify the way the agenda is set, to explic-
itly consider non-market aspects of technology adoption and use.
Not surprisingly, it is generally easier to agree on the need to the change 
the agenda-setting process than on the definition of a beneficial outcome. 
Here, the discussion concentrates on how the agenda is set in order to iden-
tify possible forms of intervention or modification with the ultimate goal of 
changing outcome. The agenda-setting process can be altered ex ante or ex 
post, that is, before development choices are made or after a technology has 
emerged but before it appears on the market.
E X  A N T E  INTERVENTION
The question of how choices are made is a fruitful one for discussion, especially 
as an alternative to the “Monday morning quarterbacking” that currently 
characterizes the debate over agricultural biotechnology agenda-setting. In 
addition to signals sent by the market, R & D directions are determined by the
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opportunities afforded by the scientific frontier and by a host of non-market 
signals. External private market signals to researchers are accompanied by ex-
ternal signals from public agencies (as through funding or regulatory decisions) 
and by internal values and characteristics of researchers. The role of the exter-
nal market signals has been extensively considered, as discussed, but less atten-
tion has been paid, in agriculture anyway, to the public and internal signals 
that determine problem choice.
The question of how a researcher’s experience, background and compe-
tence affect problem choice is complicated. I recently considered the case of 
agricultural economists, starting from the intuitively appealing premise that 
generational change in the population of scientists will have an impact on the 
discipline’s research agenda (Offutt 1993). As was typical of most agricultural 
science disciplines, the agricultural economics area was comprised of white men 
from farm backgrounds who were trained at land-grant universities. How-
ever, the post-World War II generation became more diverse: more women 
and minorities from suburban and urban backgrounds educated at land-grant 
universities, as well as liberal arts colleges and private universities. Without 
going into depth about the analysis, suffice it to say that I found it worthwhile 
to explore the implications of changes in characteristics of agricultural scien-
tists at a time when the relevance of the traditional research agenda is being 
challenged.
To turn to the question of public sector signals, it is perhaps ironic to note 
that the public agricultural research agenda-setting process is the envy of some 
other parts of the scientific community. The multilayered system of priority-
setting that links state and federal efforts is seen as transparent and participa-
tory. However, this admiration is not universally shared. As but one example, 
consider the animated dialogue between advocates of sustainable agriculture 
and the managers of USDA’s Competitive Grants Program—the National Re-
search Initiative (NRI). Considerable effort by both groups has been devoted 
to modifying grant proposal review to reflect the goal of sustainability—an ef-
fort which is in no small way complicated by the lack of a working definition of 
the concept. And, in starting a major study, the National Research Council’s 
Board on Agriculture has expressed its concern for the future effectiveness of 
the land-grant colleges of agriculture, a very large component of the public 
system. These process-oriented efforts more generally reflect a concern about 
the nature of the outcome of agenda-setting for agricultural biotechnology 
and agricultural research.
E X  P O S T  INTERVENTION
It will be impossible to eliminate controversy over whether a technology is 
beneficial or not. Consequently, ex post (post-development, pre-market) 
intervention will remain a live, if costly, option. To return to the traditional 
paradigm, economic theory says that such intervention in the market is
inappropriate as a means of achieving non-market goals. Instead, non-mar-
ket tools should be employed such as compensatory payments to those who 
might be adversely affected by a market outcome. If the problem were per-
ceived to be uneven income distribution among farmers, which might be ex-
acerbated by the adoption of a new technology, then the most efficient inter-
vention is a transfer payment from the public treasury directly to poorer farmers. 
This approach recognizes that, while technologies have undeniable positive 
and negative socioeconomic impacts, it is hard to “reverse-engineer” the de-
velopment process to predict the outcome of technology adoption well enough 
to allow control from the start. Sometimes even the best intentions go awry. 
To draw an example from outside agriculture, consider the development of 
labor-saving devices for housework like the vacuum-cleaner, which, one might 
have supposed, would have freed women from having to spend so much time 
cleaning. Alas, there is considerable evidence that has not been the case.
Ex post intervention potentially involves acting on the fourth criterion, 
moving beyond a regulatory consideration of quality, safety and efficacy. Im-
plementation can be tricky, however. What actions would be taken—prohibi-
tion of a technology or restrictions on its use? Imposition of taxes or subsidies? 
Who would be empowered to take these actions—appointed or elected offi-
cials? Permanent civil servants? Citizen groups? Given that intervention of 
this nature would be unprecedented, the question of how, or perhaps whether, 
existing rules and institutions could be modified to cope is a good one to ponder.
CONCLUSIONS
In considering the agenda-setting process for agricultural biotechnology, the 
initial question of problem definition seems key. How are needs identified or 
perceived? Given the complexity of the food and agricultural system, how 
can the contributions, and limitations, of numerous perspectives be appreci-
ated? The advent of biotechnology has hastened the day of reckoning by accen-
tuating the linkages among farming practices, the natural resource base, food 
processing, and consumption requirements and desires.
The most pressing need is to be more analytical about understanding 
how technologies evolve. This process is not strictly a function of personalities; 
there are behavioral patterns that can be understood, and presumably modi-
fied, just as there are policy instruments in place or on the shelf that affect mar-
ket and non-market signals. Any reconsideration or redesign of the process 
has to accommodate the continued prospect of argument over the beneficial 
nature of new technologies because benefits will always be accompanied by 
risks and costs. As a practical matter, we will likely not have the option of re-
peatedly denying use of any technology that adversely affects one or another 
member of society. Political judgments about acceptability will have to be 
made. This is necessarily a messy process and perhaps one unfamiliar to agri-
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culturalists who have enjoyed 100 or more years of relative consensus about 
what they do and why. Institutional innovation, not personal attack, would 
seem to be the order of the day.
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